

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Western District of Washington

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
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In the Matter of the Search of

(Briefly describe the property to be searched  
or identify the person by name and address)A Computer Accessing E-mail Account  
lavandos@dr.com

Case No. MJ-16-551

## APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.

located in the Western District of Washington or elsewhere, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- ☒ evidence of a crime;
- ☐ contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
- ☐ property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
- ☐ a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section	Offense Description
18 U.S.C. § 875 (d)	Interstate Threats to Extort
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)	Damaging to a Protected Computer
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(7)	Extortion by Threatening or in Relation to Damaging a Protected Computer

The application is based on these facts:

See Affidavit of Chris Hansen, Seattle Police Department, United States Secret Service Task Force Officer, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference

- ☒ Continued on the attached sheet.
- ☒ Delayed notice of        days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: 04/23/2018) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

Applicant's signature

Chris Hansen, SPD-USSS Task Force Officer

Printed name and title

Sworn to before me pursuant to CrimRule 4.1.

Date:

Dec 23, 2016

City and state: Seattle, Washington

Judge's signature

James P. Donohue, United States Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

**ATTACHMENT A**

**Location to be Searched**

This warrant authorizes the use of a network investigative technique on any computer accessing the e-mail account lavandos@dr.com.

**ATTACHMENT B**

**Information to be Seized**

The following information that may assist in identifying the computer, its location, other information about the computer, and the user of the computer, all of which is evidence of violations of 18 USC §§ 875(d), 1030(a)(5), and 1030(a)(7)(A) & (C):

- a. The computer's IP address and the communication port number used by the computer to access the United States Secret Service server.
- b. The computer's open communication ports.
- c. The type of operating system running on the computer, including type (e.g., Windows), version (e.g., Windows 10), and license number.
- d. The computer's language encoding and default language.
- e. The computer's time zone information.
- f. The registered computer name (more commonly referred to as the "host name") and registered company domain name.
- g. The user name of the currently logged-in user.
- h. A list of the user names of other local user accounts on the computer.
- i. The computer's wired and wireless network connection information.
- j. A list of the wireless network identifiers of wireless access points that have been saved to the computer.
- k. The list of IP addresses and port numbers of currently-connected and recently-connected computers.

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, Chris Hansen, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

**INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND**

1. I am an officer with the Seattle Police Department (SPD), commissioned through the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, and have been since June 2000. I received my law enforcement training from the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission Basic Law Enforcement Academy. I serve as a Detective in SPD's Fraud, Forgery and Financial Exploitation Unit. In that capacity, I have conducted investigations involving forgery, theft, possession of stolen property, credit card fraud, Internet fraud, embezzlement, securities fraud, insurance fraud and identity theft.

2. I currently serve as a computer forensic examiner and task force officer on the United States Secret Service - Electronic Crimes Task Force (USSS-ECTF), and, in connection with that assignment, have been specially deputized as a Special Deputy United States Marshal. I have served as a task force officer for the USSS-ECTF since August 2008, and as a computer forensic examiner since March 2010. During the course of this assignment, I have participated in investigations of numerous electronic crime cases, including network intrusion incidents, point-of-sale breach incidents, skimming incidents, sales of credit card dumps, e-mail phishing schemes and credit card cashout schemes. During my time on the USSS-ECTF, I have received over 1,400 hours of training in digital forensics, including courses on the topics of network intrusion and point-of-sale breach investigations.

3. I make this affidavit in support of applications under Rule 41(b)(6)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for two search warrants to use network investigative techniques (NITs). One of those two applications requests approval to send communications to the e-mail account lavandos@dr.com that are designed to cause

1 whatever computer is used to open these communications to transmit data that will  
2 identify the computer, its location, other information about the computer, and the user of  
3 the computer. The other application requests approval to send communications to e-mail  
4 account lavandos@india.com that are designed to cause whatever computer is used to  
5 open these communications to transmit the same data concerning that computer.

6 4. As set forth herein, there is probable cause to believe that the user(s) of the  
7 e-mail accounts lavandos@dr.com and lavandos@india.com have committed violations  
8 of 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) (which prohibits transmission in interstate and foreign commerce  
9 of threats to injure property that are made with the intent to extort), 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)  
10 (which prohibits transmitting programs, code, and commands to protected computers and,  
11 thereby, damaging such computers), and 18 USC § 1030(a)(7)(A) & (C) (which prohibit  
12 threatening to damage a protected computer and demanding money in relation to  
13 damaging a protected computer). There also is probable cause to believe that evidence of  
14 the identity of the person(s) who have committed these violations exists on the computers  
15 that will be used to open communications sent to these two e-mail accounts, and that this  
16 evidence will be obtained through the use of the NITs for which this Affidavit is being  
17 submitted.

18 5. This information contained in this Affidavit is based on my own  
19 investigation, as well as upon information received from the persons identified in this  
20 Affidavit. This Affidavit does not contain all of the information that I have gathered  
21 during my investigation. Rather, the Affidavit contains only the information that I  
22 believe is relevant to the determination of probable cause for the requested warrants.

### 23 THE INVESTIGATION

24 6. On December 6, 2016, the USSS Seattle Field Office received a request for  
25 assistance from a representative of the South Correctional Entity (SCORE) Jail in Des  
26 Moines. The SCORE Jail is a jail in Des Moines, Washington, that serves seven member  
27 cities and a number of contract agencies. The SCORE Jail reported that it had just  
28

1 discovered ransomware on its computer network. I subsequently participated in a  
2 telephone call with A.M, the Information Technology Director for the SCORE Jail.

3 7. A.M. told me that a user on the SCORE Jail's computer network had  
4 reported that the user was unable to access the user's computer files on a server that the  
5 SCORE Jail uses to facilitate remote searches of jail records by law enforcement officers  
6 with accounts on the SCORE Jail computer system. That server is accessible through the  
7 world wide web, and when users (even those in Washington State) contact it, their  
8 communications commonly are routed through other states. According to A.M., the files  
9 all had been renamed by the addition of the extension ".[lavandos@dr.com].wallet" to the  
10 files' names, and the files no longer could be opened by the computer programs that  
11 previously had been used to create and access the files.

12 8. In addition to the now-inaccessible files, A.M. located a JPG computer file  
13 on the SCORE Jail's computer system that contained the following text:

14  
15 //hallo, our dear friend! //looks like you have some troubles  
16 with your security //all your files are now encrypted //using  
17 third-party recovering software will corrupt your data //you  
18 have only one way to get them back safely – using our  
19 decryption tool //to get original decryption tool contact us  
20 with email in subject line write your ID, which you can find  
21 in name of every crypted file, also attach to email 3 crypted  
22 files lavandos@dr.com //it is in your interest to respond [sic]  
23 as soon as possible to ensure the restoration of your files,  
24 because we won't keep your decryption keys at our servers  
25 more than 72 hours in interest of our security //P.S. only in  
26 case you don't receive a response from the first email address  
27 within 24 hours, please use this alternative email address  
28 lavandos@india.com.

25 Based upon my experience and training, I believe that the person(s) who encrypted  
26 SCORE Jail files, and sent this message to the SCORE Jail, is/are perpetrating a  
27 "ransomware" scheme – that is, a scheme in which a victim's computer files are held  
28 hostage through encryption, and in which the perpetrator(s) will demand payment in  
order to decrypt the files.

1           9.       According to Whois.com, a website that provides information concerning  
2 web domains, the domains dr.com and india.com both are registered to World Media  
3 Group, LLC, a Bedminster, New Jersey, company. I do not have any additional  
4 information identifying the person or entity who established the specific e-mail addresses  
5 lavandos@dr.com and lavandos@india.com.

6           10.     A.M. further stated the malware accessed the system through the account of  
7 a user with the user name vmartinez, who, an Auburn, Washington, police officer. The  
8 SCORE Jail believes that vmartinez is himself a hacking victim, rather than the  
9 perpetrator of the ransomware scheme I am investigating. A.M. also stated that the  
10 vmartinez account on the SCORE jail computer system had been accessed from a number  
11 of different Internet Protocol addresses (IP addresses) at different locations over a period  
12 of months.

13          11.     While we were speaking, A.M. noticed an unfamiliar program named  
14 bendix.exe running in the Downloads folder for the vmartinez user account. A.M. made  
15 a copy of bendix.exe. I asked A.M. to make an image of the RAM on the machine on  
16 which bendix.exe was currently running. A.M. began to collect the RAM image while  
17 we continued to speak. A short time later, A.M. reported that the malware was now  
18 encrypting and renaming files in the computer folder to which the RAM capture was  
19 being saved.

20          12.     On December 9, 2016, at my direction, A.M. sent an e-mail to the e-mail  
21 address lavandos@dr.com that stated, "Please help. I don't understand your instructions  
22 to get my files back. You say there is an ID, what does it look like. Is it a number? What  
23 do you need me to do? I need to get my files back ASAP. \[A.M.], Information  
24 Technology Director." Shortly after sending that e-mail, A.M. received an e-mail from  
25 lavandos@dr.com that stated, "hello, [A.] \just send us 3 crypted files \after this i will  
26 tell you how to proceed." I inspected the e-mail header information and observed the  
27 originating IP address address was 37.220.35.202. I checked the IP address via  
28

1 domaintools.com and discovered that this IP address was listed as a Tor exit node  
2 operated by Rens Ariens of YISP Colo in the Netherlands.

3 13. The Tor network is a publicly-available tool used for anonymizing a user's  
4 web traffic. It is a network that provides free access to all subscribers. The network  
5 obfuscates a user's location by encrypting the user's connection and routing the user's  
6 traffic through multiple participating nodes to complete an anonymous connection. As a  
7 result, the fact that the e-mail emanated from a Tor exit node in the Netherlands does not  
8 actually indicate that the sender of the e-mail is in the Netherlands. Rather, it is  
9 impossible to determine the sender's location.

10 14. According to A.M., the ransomware attack on the SCORE Jail's file servers  
11 caused a major disruption to work for over 12 hours. The ransomware infected a primary  
12 network share used by every employee at the SCORE Jail that contains files essential for  
13 their job duties. Once discovered, the network share had to be taken offline to stop  
14 further infections. SCORE Jail had to restore the contents of the shared folder from the  
15 previous night's off-site backup, which caused a loss of data from any file modifications  
16 made in the interim. The ransomware also infected a software program used by several  
17 law enforcement agencies to create lineup montages, infecting the image files used for  
18 creating these lineups and preventing law enforcement officers from accessing the system  
19 to look up inmate booking photos and tattoo images.

20 **PLACES TO BE SEARCHED AND PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED**

21 15. Based on my training, experience, and the information described above, I  
22 believe that using a NIT may help identify the user(s) of the lavandos@dr.com and  
23 lavandos@india.com e-mail accounts. Accordingly, this warrant application seeks  
24 authority to use the NIT, which will be deployed via e-mail to these two e-mail accounts.

25 16. Specifically, the NIT will cause a computer on which it is opened to send  
26 various identifying information regarding that computer back to a computer controlled by  
27 the USSS. I intend to conceal the NIT within a file named Shift Scheduler Installer. I  
28 then intend to zip (that is, compress) the file. With the cooperation of the SCORE Jail, I



1 intend to then place the zipped file on the SCORE Jail's computer and to expose it to the  
2 malware on the SCORE Jail's system. Exposing the zipped file to the malware will cause  
3 the zipped file to become encrypted.

4 17. Once the malware has encrypted the zipped file containing the NIT, the  
5 SCORE Jail will send this encrypted file, and two other encrypted files, to  
6 lavandos@dr.com and, subsequently, to lavandos@india.com. I expect that, when the  
7 perpetrator(s) of the ransomware scheme receive(s) these encrypted files, the  
8 perpetrator(s) will use an encryption key to unencrypt the files and will then return the  
9 unencrypted files to the SCORE Jail as proof that the perpetrator(s) of the ransomware  
10 scheme are able to decrypt encrypted files.

11 18. At that point, the SCORE Jail will contact the perpetrator(s) of the  
12 ransomware scheme and tell the perpetrator(s) that the unzipped Shift Scheduler Installer  
13 file is not functional. The SCORE Jail will ask the perpetrator(s) to examine the  
14 unzipped file and to repair it. The SCORE Jail also will e-mail the perpetrator(s) a copy  
15 of the unencrypted file (to cover the possibility that the perpetrator(s) did not retain a  
16 copy of the file). If the perpetrator(s), in fact, examine(s) the unzipped file, and in doing  
17 so attempt(s) to run the file, the action of pressing the "run" button will launch the NIT.

18 19. Once activated, the NIT will conduct a one-time limited search of the  
19 computer on which the NIT has been launched. Specifically, the NIT will collect  
20 information that will assist in identifying the computer, its location, other information  
21 about the computer, and the user of the computer. The NIT will then cause this  
22 information to be sent over the Internet to a computer controlled by the USSS. The  
23 information that the NIT will collect and send to the USSS is:

- 24 a. The computer's IP address and the communication port  
25 number used by the computer to access the USSS  
26 server. An IP address is a unique numeric address  
27 used to direct information over the Internet. An IP  
28 version 4 (IPv4) address is a 32-bit binary number (a

1 sequence of 32 ones and zeros representing a number  
2 to a computer). For convenience of reading and  
3 writing by humans, IPv4 addresses are typically  
4 represented by four decimal numbers in the range 0-  
5 255, separated by periods (e.g., 121.56.97.178). An IP  
6 version 6 (IPv6) address is a 128-bit binary number (a  
7 sequence of 128 ones and zeros representing a number  
8 to a computer). For convenience, an IPv6 address is  
9 typically written as eight groups of four hexadecimal  
10 digits (using the characters 0-9 and A-F), separated by  
11 the colon character (e.g.,  
12 2001:0db8:0000:0042:0000:8a2e). Conceptually, IP  
13 addresses are similar to telephone numbers in that they  
14 are used to identify computers that send and receive  
15 information over the Internet. A communications port  
16 number is used in different ways by a "server"  
17 computer (a computer that is "listening" for incoming  
18 connections) and a "client" computer (a computer that  
19 initiates a connection to a server computer). A server  
20 computer "listens" on one or more standard  
21 communications ports that are associated with  
22 particular services. For example, a web server is  
23 expected to listen on port 80 for connections to serve  
24 web pages. A client computer uses a communications  
25 port number as an identifier to receive return  
26 information coming back from a server, and to keep  
27 concurrent connections with different servers  
28 separated. Conceptually, a port number is like a

1 telephone extension number at an office with multiple  
2 phones served by the same telephone number. The  
3 standard port numbers such as 80 for a web server are  
4 analogous to published extensions at a business, such  
5 as extension 0 for the operator. The port number used  
6 by the client is analogous to a telephone number and  
7 extension that a caller records in a voicemail message  
8 to allow the business to call the client back.

- 9 b. The computer's open communication ports.
- 10 c. The type of operating system running on the computer,  
11 including type (e.g. Windows), version (e.g. Windows  
12 10), and license number.
- 13 d. The computer's language encoding and default  
14 language. Users can set computers to display text in a  
15 particular language.
- 16 e. The computer's time zone information.
- 17 f. The registered computer name (more commonly  
18 referred to as the "host name") and registered company  
19 domain name. Users can input this information when  
20 the computer's operating system is first installed and  
21 may update this information later.
- 22 g. The user name of the currently logged-in user account.
- 23 h. A list of the user names of other local user accounts on  
24 the computer.
- 25 i. The computer's wired and wireless network connection  
26 configuration information. This information identifies  
27 the way the computer is connected to the Internet.
- 28

- 1 j. A list of the wireless network identifiers of wireless  
2 access points that have been saved to the computer.  
3 This list identifies wireless networks that the computer  
4 previously connected to and which were saved by  
5 operator of the computer. This may identify other  
6 ways that the computer connects to the Internet.
- 7 k. The list of IP addresses and port numbers of currently-  
8 connected and recently-connected computers. This list  
9 identifies other computers that the computer is  
10 connected to or has recently connected to, and may  
11 identify whether the operator of the computer has  
12 connected to it remotely from another computer.

13 20. Each of these categories of information can help to identify the computer  
14 receiving the NIT and/or that computer's user. The computer's true assigned IP address  
15 can be associated with an Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), and through that, a particular  
16 ISP customer. The communications port number being used to communicate to the  
17 USSS server is required by some ISP companies along with the IP address and the date  
18 and time of communication to particularly identify a customer. This is typically required  
19 in those cases where an ISP with many customers but few assigned IP addresses uses the  
20 same IP address (but different port numbers) for several customers, and keeps records  
21 about which customer was assigned each port number. The operating system can  
22 corroborate the identity of a computer and, in the case of an operating system's license  
23 number, identify the user, because some companies maintain records of purchasers of  
24 their operating systems. The language encoding and computer default language can help  
25 identify the subject by identifying his native language. Time zone information can  
26 establish the geographical location of the subject computer. The computer name,  
27 company name, logged-in user name, and list of user names of other user accounts can  
28 identify the network, specific computer on a network, and perhaps even the name of the

1 person using the computer. Wireless network connection information can tell from  
2 where a computer accessed the Internet, even if it was through the unauthorized use of a  
3 wireless network (a technique used by Internet criminals). Wired network information  
4 and dial-up account information can help identify what computer was used to access the  
5 Internet to receive the NIT. The list of open and recent connections may reveal the IP  
6 address used by the subject to connect remotely from another computer to the computer  
7 on which the subject actually opens e-mails and launches the NIT.

8 21. I believe that using a NIT is necessary in this case, because the  
9 perpetrator(s) of the ransomware scheme have used the Tor network to conceal the IP  
10 address from which the perpetrator(s) is/are communicating with the SCORE Jail. The  
11 information provided by the NIT should help identify the perpetrator(s) of the scheme,  
12 despite this deliberate concealment.

13 22. Because the NIT will be delivered by e-mail addressed to the e-mail  
14 accounts lavandos@dr.com and lavandos@india.com, and because it is being delivered in  
15 an encrypted file, the NIT can be accessed only by someone who has access to one of  
16 these e-mail accounts, and who also has access to the decryption keys for the ransomware  
17 scheme that I am investigating. As a result, the NIT will only search, and identify, a  
18 computer being used by a perpetrator of the scheme, as opposed to any other computer.

19 **TIME AND MANNER OF EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH**

20 23. Rule 41(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a  
21 warrant command the law enforcement officer (a) "to execute the warrant within a  
22 specified time no longer than 14 days" and (b) to "execute the warrant during the daytime  
23 unless the judge for good cause expressly authorizes execution at another time . . . ." I  
24 hereby request permission to deploy the NIT at any time of day or night within 14 days of  
25 the date the warrants are authorized. There is good cause to allow such a method of  
26 execution, since the time of deployment causes no additional intrusiveness or  
27 inconvenience to anyone. In addition, the government will not be able to control the time  
28 when a subject accesses the lavandos@dr.com and lavandos@india.com e-mail accounts

1 and when the subject seeks to run the unencrypted Shift Scheduler Installer software, and  
2 thereby launches the NIT.

3 **DELAYED NOTIFICATION**

4 24. I hereby request that the Court authorize me to delay notification of the  
5 execution of the warrant for a period of 180 days after the execution of the warrant. 18  
6 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) authorizes delayed notification where certain conditions are met.

7 Those conditions are met in this case because:

- 8 a. There is reasonable cause to believe that providing  
9 immediate notification of the warrant may have an  
10 adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705. The  
11 perpetrator(s) of the ransomware scheme is/are not  
12 aware that I am seeking to use a NIT to identify and  
13 locate their computers, and, through that, the  
14 perpetrator(s). Providing immediate notice to  
15 perpetrator(s) of the scheme would seriously  
16 jeopardize the ongoing investigation, since such a  
17 disclosure would give the perpetrator(s) an opportunity  
18 to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior,  
19 notify confederates, and flee from prosecution. See 18  
20 U.S.C. § 2705.
- 21 b. The warrant does not seek the seizure of any tangible  
22 property, or any wire or electronic communication. To  
23 the extent the warrant authorizes the seizure of stored  
24 wire or electronic information, there is a reasonable  
25 necessity for its seizure, since the information to be  
26 seized is limited in scope and necessary to identify the  
27 perpetrators of the ransomware scheme.
- 28

1           c.     This investigation is likely to take a substantial time.  
2                 Even if the NIT succeeds, the information obtained  
3                 through the use of the NIT may provide leads, but not  
4                 fully identify the perpetrator(s) of the ransomware  
5                 scheme. Additional investigation to complete that  
6                 identification, and gather necessary electronic  
7                 evidence before it is destroyed is likely to take many  
8                 months. As a result, a one-year delay in notification is  
9                 reasonable. (In the event that the investigation is  
10                completed more quickly, and the perpetrator(s)  
11                arrested in less than 180 days, I will provide  
12                notification promptly following the arrest.)

### 13                               **JURISDICTION**

14           25.    This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant under recently-  
15 amended Rule 41(b)(6)(A), even if the computers to be searched are outside this District,  
16 because the above facts establish there is probable cause to believe that the location of the  
17 computers accessing the e-mail accounts being used by the perpetrator(s) has been  
18 concealed through technological means, namely, the use of the Tor network, and that  
19 there is probable cause to believe that activities related to the crime being investigated,  
20 namely, the hacking of the SCORE Jail's computers, have occurred within this judicial  
21 district.


### 22                               **REQUEST FOR SEALING**

23           26.    I further requested that this Court issue an order sealing, until further order  
24 of the Court, all papers submitted in support of this application, including the application  
25 and search warrant. I believe that sealing these document is necessary because the search  
26 is part of an ongoing investigation. Based upon my training and experience, I have  
27 learned that online criminals commonly search for criminal affidavits and search warrants  
28 via the Internet, and disseminate them to other online criminals as they deem appropriate,

1 e.g., post them publicly online through the criminal forums. Premature disclosure of the  
2 contents of this affidavit and related documents may have a significant and negative  
3 impact on the continuing investigation, including by allowing perpetrator(s) an  
4 opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, and  
5 flee from prosecution.

6 **CONCLUSION**

7 27. Based on the information identified above there is probable cause to believe  
8 that evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(d), 1030(a)(5) and 1030(a)(7)(A) & (C)  
9 will be found on the computer(s) that access the e-mail accounts lavandos@dr.com  
10 and/or lavandos@india.com and to believe that employing the NIT sought by this  
11 affidavit will result in the seizure of that evidence.


12  
13  
14 

15 CHRIS HANSEN  
16 Detective, Seattle Police Department  
17 TFO, United States Secret Service

18 AFFIDAVIT subscribed and sworn to before me this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of December 2016  
19

20  
21   
22 JAMES P. DONOHUE  
23 United States Magistrate Judge  
24

25 Approved as to form:

26   
27 ANDREW C. FRIEDMAN  
28 Assistant United States Attorney